






How Do Language and Thought Influence Each Other?
A Reconsideration of Their Relationship with Parallel 
References to the History of Philosophy and Cognitive Linguistics
Abstract
The paper explores the relationship of language and thought with respect to their mutual 
determination or influence. Two questions are considered crucial: how do we learn the 
meanings of conventional linguistic signs, including those for abstract concepts, and how 
do we express our original insights, thoughts and feelings through not-yet-conventional lin-
guistic means. These are followed by succinct answers and extensive elaborations referring 
to opposite views and linguistic examples from the history of philosophy and cognitive lin-
guistics. It is argued that linguistic expressions, including metaphors, mostly incorporate 
how people represent (or once represented) the world to themselves through imagination 
and present (or once presented) the world to others through language. Hence language 
neither directly shows how we conceive and understand the world nor how we construct it 
in our thoughts. On the other hand, symbolization through metaphor and metonymy, as well 
as innovative verbalization, enable our cognition to communicate novel as well as abstract 





In	 social	 couple	 dances	 it	 is	 very	 important	 to	 know	which	 dance	 partner	
leads	and	which	follows,	 lest	 the	harmonious	dance	be	reduced	from	order	
to	 chaos.1	 In	 the	 theory	 of	 language	 and	 the	 everyday	 practice	 of	 using	 a	
language	it	is	equally	important	to	know	whether	thoughts	and	intentions	or	









tions,	 problems,	 and	 possible	 approaches	 to	
solving	them.	The	basic	structure	of	presenta-
tion	has	also	been	kept	in	this	paper,	although	
vastly	 extended	 and	 elaborated.	 Thoughts	
conveyed	 in	 this	paper	 are,	however,	 a	 con-
densed	 product	 of	 several	 years	 of	 explora-
tion	and	pondering	on	the	subject,	especially	
during	my	parallel	university	studies	of	phi-








thoughts	 to	others	 through	 language	or	does	our	common	 language	“speak	
with	itself”2	through	us?
Speaking	more	commonly	 in	 terms	of	modern	Western	philosophy,	 it	 is	of	
























Two	overall	questions	 that	 I	 find	crucial	 in	 this	 respect	may	be	formulated	




First question: learning conventional signs 




















The	answer	 to	 this	question	 is	 closely	 related	 to	or	 even	dependent	on	 the	
question	concerning	the	origin	of	our	cognition.	I	will	therefore	first	briefly	
outline	 two	possible	 answers	with	 the	 aid	of	 both	Kantian	philosophy	 and	
cognitive	linguistics.























same	 journal	 issue	 through	an	 interpretation	
of	 Wittgenstein’s	 Philosophical Grammar	
(Josip	 Oslić,	 Verstehen und Nichtverstehen 
in der praxisbezogenen Hermeneutik Ludwig 
Wittgensteins).
3
Popularly	 (although	 questionably)	 under-
stood,	 as	 present	 in	 Wittgenstein’s	 famous	
dictum:	“Die Grenzen meiner Sprache	bedeu-
ten	die	Grenzen	meiner	Welt.”	/	“The limits of 
my language	mean	 the	 limits	of	my	world.”	
Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Tractatus logico-philo-




A	 fictitious	 and	 general	 but	 already	 mature	
answer	could	be	posited	as	follows:	“Yes,	to	
some	 extent,	 my	 thoughts	 are	 directed	 and	
shaped	through	the	language	I	speak.	And	yes,	
to	some	extent,	the	language	I	use	was	and	is	
being	 cultivated	 and	 developed	 through	 the	





By	 formulating	 the	 question	 thus,	 I	 do	 not	
intend	 to	 reduce	 language	 to	 nomenclature,	
i.e.	 a	 list	 of	 names	 for	 things	 and	 events,	
but	only	to	state	the	problem	for	the	present	
purpose	 as	 clear	 and	 simple	 as	 possible.	 I	
do	 not	 constrain	 meaning	 to	 (extralinguis-
tic)	 reference	 (in	Frege’s	distinction	of	Sinn 
(sense)	 and	 Bedeutung (reference);	 Frege’s	
famous	example	is	that	the	morning star and	
the	evening star have	different	senses	but	the	
same	 meaning/reference,	 namely	 the	 planet	
Venus.	 See:	Gottlob	 Frege,	 “Über	 Sinn	 und	
Bedeutung”,	 in:	 Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
und philosophische Kritik,	Verlag	von	C.	E.	
M.	Pfeffer,	Leipzig	1892,	pp.	25–50.	Meaning	
can	 be	 found	 in	 various	 fields	 of	 our	 expe-
rience,	 not	 to	 exclude	 those	 stemming	 from	









of Pure Reason (11781,	 21787)	 for	 two	 rea-


















However,	 there	 is	 another	 possible	 and	 maybe	 even	 wide-spread	 answer	











In	Metaphors We Live By (1980)	 they	 called	 this	 position	experientialism,	
strictly	distinguishing	it	not	only	from	rationalism	but	also	from	empiricism,	
i.e.	 from	 two	positions	which,	according	 to	 these	authors,	both	err	 in	 their	
common	myth	of	objectivism	and	their	claim	to	absolute	knowledge.9
Later,	as	in	Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenges 






































arbitraire,	(…)	le signe linguistique est arbi-
traire. (…)	 Le	 mot	 arbitraire appelle	 aussi	
une	remarque.	Il	ne	doit	pas	donner	l’idée	que	
le	 signifiant	 dépend	 du	 libre	 choix	 du	 sujet	
parlant:	 (…)	nous	voulons	dire	qu’il	est	 im-
motivé, c’est-à-dire	 arbitraire	 par	 rapport	 au	
signifié,	 avec	 lequel	 il	 n’a	 aucune	 attache	
naturelle	 dans	 la	 réalité.”	 See:	 Ferdinand	
de	 Saussure,	 Cours de linguistique géné-
rale,	Éditions	Payot	&	Rivages,	Paris	1967,	
pp.	 100–101.	 English	 translation	 (tr.	 Wade	




tic	 sign	 is	arbitrary.	 (…)	The	word	arbitrary	
also	calls	for	comment.	The	term	should	not	
imply	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 signifier	 is	 left	
entirely	to	the	speaker;	(…)	I	mean	that	it	is	
unmotivated,	 i.e.	 arbitrary	 in	 that	 it	 actually	
has	no	natural	connection	with	the	signified.”
8
That	 there	 is	 no	 official	 “philosophical	 po-
sition	 of	 Cognitive	 Linguistics”	 is	 stressed	
by	 Peter	 Harder:	 “No	 consensus	 has	 been	
achieved,	 either	 inside	 or	 outside	 Cogni-
tive	 Linguistics,	 on	 the	 precise	 status	 and	
properties	 of	mental	 entities,	 including	 their	
relation	 both	 to	 the	 human	body	 that	 gener-
ates	 them	 and	 to	 the	 outside	 cultural	 and	
physical	 environment.”	 See:	 Peter	 Harder,	
“Cognitive	 Linguistics	 and	 Philosophy”,	 in:	
Dirk	Geeraerts,	Hubert	Cuyckens	(eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics,	


















world.	 Plant	 life	 has	 been	 important	 to	 our	
evolution,	 and	 so	 the	 ability	 to	 place	 in	 one	
category	the	things	that	are	green	has	apparent	
value	for	survival	and	flourishing.	The	same	








Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind 
and Its Challenge to Western Thought,	Basic	
Books,	New	York	1999,	p.	18,	25.
9




and	 unconditional	 truths	 about	 the	 world	 is	
the	cornerstone	of	the	Western	philosophical	
tradition.	The	myth	 of	 objectivity	 has	 flour-














derstood	 as	 “in	 the	mathematical	 sense	of	 a	
set	of	ordered	pairs,	where	 the	 first	 element	
of	each	pair	 is	 from	the	source	domain,	and	
the	 second	 is	 from	 the	 target	 domain.”	See:	
Ray	 Jackendoff,	 David	 H.	 Aaron,	 “Review	
of	 More	 than	 Cool	 Reason:	A	 Field	 Guide	
to	 Poetic	 Metaphor	 by	 George	 Lakoff	 and	
Mark	 Turner”,	 Language	 67	 (2/1991),	 pp.	
320–338,	 p.	 335,	 footnote.	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.2307/415109.
11
Cf.	George	 Lakoff,	 Rafael	 E	Núñez,	Where 
Mathematics Comes From. How the Embod-
ied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being,	Ba-
sic	Books,	New	York	2000.
12
G.	 Lakoff,	M.	 Johnson,	Metaphors We Live 
By,	p.	3.
13





































For	Lakoff	 and	 Johnson,	 the	 concept	 IN	directly	 emerges	 from	our	 spatial	











states.	What	 these	cases	show	is	 that	 it	 is	possible	 to	have	equally	basic	kinds	of	experience	
while	having	conceptualizations	of	them	that	are	not	equally	basic.”17















Philosophy in the Flesh (1999)	Lakoff	and	Johnson	were	eager	to	show	how	
and	which	metaphors	 directed	 or	 even	predetermined	 the	 scope	 and	 limits	
of	 the	 philosophical	 views	 of	 the	 Presocratics,	 Plato,	Aristotle,	 Descartes,	
Enlightenment	thinkers,	Kant’s	ethics,	modern	analytic	thinkers,	and	Noam	
Chomsky	–	without	any	of	these	being	aware	of	the	metaphors	at	work!	For	






“Traditional	methods	 of	 philosophical	 analysis	 alone,	 even	 phenomenological	 introspection,	
cannot	come	close	to	allowing	us	to	know	our	own	minds.”19
assumption	that	language	reﬂects	patterns	of	
thought.	 Therefore,	 to	 study	 language	 from	
this	 perspective	 is	 to	 study	 patterns	 of	 con-
ceptualisation.	 Language	 offers	 a	 window	
into	 cognitive	 function,	 providing	 insights	
into	 the	 nature,	 structure	 and	 organisation	
of	 thoughts	 and	 ideas.”	See:	Vyvyan	Evans,	





























Johnson	 in	 1987,	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “recur-
ring	patterns	of	our	sensory-motor	experience	
by	which	we	make	 sense	of	 that	 experience	
and	reason	about	 it,	and	that	can	also	be	re-
cruited	 to	 structure	 abstract	 concepts	 and	 to	
carry	 out	 inferences	 about	 abstract	 domains	
of	thought.”	See:	Marc	Johnson,	“The	Philo-
sophical	Significance	of	Image	Schemas”,	in:	
Beate	Hampe	(ed.),	From Perception to Mean-














The	 statement	 is	 elaborated	 on	 the	 two	 fol-
lowing	pages:	“The	cognitive	unconscious	is	
vast	and	intricately	structured.	It	includes	not	
only	 all	 our	 automatic	 cognitive	 operations,	
but	also	all	our	implicit	knowledge.	All	of	our	
knowledge	 and	 beliefs	 are	 framed	 in	 terms	
of	a	conceptual	system	that	resides	mostly	in	
the	 cognitive	 unconscious.	Our	 unconscious	
conceptual	 system	 functions	 like	 a	 ‘hidden	
hand’	 that	 shapes	 how	we	 conceptualize	 all	
aspects	of	our	experience.	This	hidden	hand	
gives	 form	 to	 the	 metaphysics	 that	 is	 built	
into	our	ordinary	conceptual	systems.	(…)	It	










































by	or	 reflects	how	our	 conceptual	 system	works	on	 the	unconscious	 level.	
On	the	other	hand,	a	better	understanding	of	this	unconscious	level	coming	





The second question: creating non-conventional meanings 



















experiences,	 thoughts	or	 insights	which	 are	present	 in	 their	 consciousness,	










tion.	That	 the	 latter	was	 regarded	by	 Johnson	and	Lakoff	 in	Philosophy in 
As	we	will	see,	what	counts	as	an	‘intuitive’	
philosophical	 theory	 is	 one	 that	 draws	upon	
these	 unconscious	 metaphors.”	 See:	 G.	 La-







The	place	at	stake	 is	 found	at	 the	beginning	
of	Prior Analytics,	24b28–30.	See:	“For	one	
term	to	be	wholly	contained	in	another	is	the	
same	as	for	 the	 latter	 to	be	predicated	of	all	















Aristotle	 used	 the	 phrase	 “is	 predicated	 of”	
(κατηγορεῖσθαι)	 interchangeably	 with	 “be-
longs/applies	 to”	 (ὑπάρχειν).	 One	 could	
therefore	equally	argue	 that	he	conceived	of	
predication	in	terms	of	belonging.	Moreover,	







must	 remove	 from	 the	 syllogisms	 that	what	
may	be	called	matter,	preserving	only	its	form.	
This	was	 done	 by	Aristotle,	who	 introduced	
letters	instead	of	concrete	subjects	and	predi-
cates.”	See:	Jan	Lukasiewicz,	Aristotle’ Syllo-
gistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal 
Logic,	Clarendon	press, Oxford	21957,	p.	2.
24
“Reason	 is	 evolutionary,	 in	 that	 abstract	
reason	builds	on	and	makes	use	of	 forms	of	
perceptual	 and	 motor	 inference	 present	 in	
‘lower’	animals.	The	result	is	a	Darwinism	of	
reason,	a	rational	Darwinism:	Reason,	even	in	
its	most	 abstract	 form,	makes	 use	 of,	 rather	
than	transcends,	our	animal	nature.”	See:	G.	





ness	 affects	 our	 society’s	 views	 on	 related	
affairs	 and	 corresponding	 inherited	 values?	
An	 example	 of	 a	 new	metaphor	Lakoff	 and	
Johnson	give	in	Metaphors We Live By (1980,	







in	 terms	of	 it.	 If	 a	new	metaphor	enters	our	
conceptual	 system	 that	 we	 base	 our	 actions	
on,	 it	 will	 alter	 that	 conceptual	 system	 and	
the	 perceptions	 and	 actions	 that	 the	 system	
gives	rise	to.	Much	of	cultural	change	arises	




































the	meaning	of	 the	 third	divine	hypostasis	of	 the	Trinity	 (“Holy	Ghost”	or	
“Holy	Spirit”	as	Spiritus Sanctus).	Despite	 the	linguistic	formation	of	 their	
expression,	neither	the	philosophical	concept	of	spirit,	as	in	Hegel’s	Phenom-
enology of Spirit (Geist	in	German),	nor	the	theological	concept	of the	Holy	


















The	 term	concept(ion) itself,	 as	well	 as	 its	conceptual	brethren	perception,	
comprehension,	and	apprehension,	apparently	all	once	passed	a	metaphorical	















In	 Greek	 (approximately):	 ἔννοια	 and	
φαντασία;	 in	 Latin:	 conceptus	 and	 visum 
(Cicero)	or	repraesentatio (later);	in	German:	






cal Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic 
Languages,	 Brill,	 Leiden	 –	Boston	 2008,	 p.	
581.	Cf.	 also	Alfred	Ernout,	Alfred	Meillet,	








spirit was	 in	 fact	 formed	 by	 onomatopoeic	
imitation	of	the	sound	of	breeze	or	breathing,	
it	could	honourably	stand	for	a	success	story	










Vedanta	 (the	Self	which	 is	 also	Brahman	or	
God,	either	in	full	non-dualism	of	Śaṅkara, or	
in	 “qualified	 non-dualism”	 of	 Rāmānuja).	
The	intermediate	meaning	was	“soul”,	which	









See:	G.	 Lakoff,	M.	 Johnson,	Metaphors We 
Live By,	p.	40.
30
Cicero	 not	 only	 translated	 Plato’s	 Timaeus,	
but	also	coined	philosophical	 terms	 in	Latin	
after	the	Greek	model.	He	thus	consequently	
used	 the	 Latin	 comprehensio to	 stand	 for	 a	
very	 prominent	 Stoic	 epistemological	 term	
κατάληψις,	 both	 of	 them	 having	 verbs	 de-
noting	some	act(s)	of	grasping	in	 their	roots	
(com-prehendere	 and	 κατα-λαμβάνω).	 “…	
concipiō (=	συλλαμβάνω):	contenir,	 recueil-
lir;	spécialement	concipere sēmina,	Cic.,	Diu.	
2,	 10,	 26,	 etc.,	 d’où	 ‘concevoir’	 (sens	 phy-
sique	 et	moral,	 concipere animō,	 Cic.,	 Leg.	
1,	 59);	 conceptiō (depuis	 Cic.	 technique)	 =	
σύλληψις,	M.	L.,	2115	(…)	La	plupart	de	ces	
verbes	sont	accompagnés	de	noms	ou	adjec-
tifs	 dérives	 en	 -tus,	 -tiō,	 -tor	 (-trīx),	 -tīcius,	
-tīuus,	 formés	 vraisemblablement	 sur	 les	
modèles	grecs	en	-ληψις,	-ληπτός,	-ληπτικός,	
qui	appartiennent	presque	tous	à	des	langues	
techniques	 (droit,	 grammaire	 ou	 rhétorique,	
philosophie)	 et	 n’apparaissent	 guère	 avant	
Cicéron.”	 See	:	A.	 Ernout,	A.	 Meillet,	Dic-




“Yes,	 but	 you	 deny	 that	 anyone	 knows any-
thing,	 except	 the	wise	 person.	 Zeno	 used	 to	
demonstrate	 this	 with	 gestures	 [gestu confi-
ciebat].	When	he	had	put	his	hand	out	flat	in	
front	him	with	his	fingers	straight,	he	would	
say:	 ‘An	 impression	 is	 like	 this	 [visum hu-
ius modi est].’	 Next,	 after	 contracting	 his	
fingers	 a	 bit:	 ‘Assent	 is	 like	 this	 [adsensus 
huius modi].’	 Then,	 when	 he	 had	 bunched	
his	 hand	 up	 to	make	 a	 fist	 [Tum cum plane 
compresserat pugnumque fecerat],	 he	would	
say	that	that	was	an	‘apprehension’	or	‘grasp’	
[conprensio/comprehensio].	(This	image	also	
suggested	 the	name	he	gave	 to	 it,	katalêpsis 
[lit.	‘grasp’],	which	hadn’t	been	used	before.)	




that	 scientific	 knowledge	 [scientia]	was	 like	
that:	a	state	none	but	the	wise	enjoyed	(…).”	
See:	Cicero,	On Academic Scepticism,	 trans-
lated	by	Charles	Brittain,	Hackett	Publishing	
Company,	 Indianapolis,	 Cambridge	 2006,	 p.	
84	 (II.145).	 For	 the	 (inserted)	 Latin	 text	 s.	
Anthony	A.	Long,	David	N.	Sedley,	The Hel-
lenistic Philosophers,	vol.	2,	Greek and Latin 



































































“In	every	language	there	are	 transcendental	expressions,	 i.e.	expressions	 that	are	common	to	
both	material	and	immaterial	things,	as	for	example,	the	movement	of	the	body	and	of	the	mind	
[Bewegung des Körpers und des Gemüts],	grasping	[fassen] a	body	and	grasping	a	thought	and	




from	this	application	to	designate	 the	super-sensible;	 this	notion	is	 the	source	of	 the	opinion	
about	 the	 tropes	 that	 I	mentioned	above.	By	contrast,	 I	 claim	 that,	 even	assuming	 this	were	








“Take,	 for	 example,	 a	 metaphor	 like	 UN-
KNOWN	 IS	UP;	KNOWN	 IS	DOWN.	Ex-
















riential	 basis	 is	 as	 arbitrary	 and	 artificial	 as	
any	ad-hoc	explanation,	which	does	not	take	
the	 diachronic	 perspective	 into	 account:	 the	




where	 representations	 are	 said	 to	 be	 “meta-
phors	for	concepts”.
34
Matthew	 S.	 McGlone,	 “Concepts	 as	 Meta-
phors”,	 in:	 Sam	 Glucksberg	 (ed.),	 Under-
standing Figurative Language. From Meta-
phors to Idioms, Oxford	 University	 Press,	
Oxford	2001,	pp.	90–107,	p.	103.
35
Sulzer’s	 views	 were	 much	 more	 moderate	
than	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson’s,	 but	 his	 follow-
ing	 claim	 was	 still	 provocative	 enough	 for	
Maimon	to	response:	“It	can	easily	be	shown	
that	the	greatest	part	of	every	language	con-
sist	 of	 tropes,	 although	 most	 of	 them	 have	
lost	 their	 tropical	 force	 [tropische Kraft],	
and	are	regarded	as	proper	expressions.	(…)	
What	 all	 tropes	 have	 in	 common	 is	 that	 the	
concept	or	representation	which	one	wants	to	
evoke	 is	 not	 being	 evoked	 immediately,	 but	








tion	 as	 proper	 expressions.	 With	 regard	 to	
expressions	grasp	[fassen],	see	[sehen],	com-
prehend	[begreifen],	represent to oneself	[sich 
vorstellen],	 deliberate	 [erwägen],	 it	 comes	
very	rarely	to	our	mind	that	these	are	tropes.”	
See:	Johann	Georg	Sulzer,	Allgemeine	Theo-
rie der schönen Künste,	 vol.	 2,	 Weidmann	
&	Reich,	 Leipzig	 1772,	 p.	 811.	 Lakoff	 and	
Johnson	 also	 claim	 that	 metaphors	 pervade	
our	ordinary	language,	but	they	do	not	agree	
that	 conventionalized	 metaphors	 lose	 their	
metaphoric	virtue	and	become	equal	to	proper	
terms.	“The	fact	that	they	are	conventionally	
fixed	 within	 the	 lexicon	 of	 English	 makes	
them	no	less	alive.”	See:	G.	Lakoff,	M.	John-
son,	Metaphors We Live By,	 p.	 55.	Namely,	
wasting time,	attacking positions (in	an	argu-

















What	 in	Maimon’s	 time	was	being	distinguished	 (in	 the	Aristotelean	 tradi-


































standing	 and	distinguishing	between	 tropes	 and	 transcendental	 expressions	
lies	 not	within	 linguistic	 investigations	 per	 se,	 but	 in	 demonstrating	 in	 the	
“interests	of	 reason	and	 true	morality”	 that	expressions	 for	 immaterial	and	
purely	intelligible	objects	are	not	improper	or	tropical	expressions	dependent	













ple’s	approach	 to	solving	a	social	 issue.	Namely,	 the	article	of	Thibodoeau	





in	 the	 first	group	by	pointing	 to	 the	need	of	better	 education,	 reduction	of	
poverty,	and	social	reform,	and	in	the	second	group	by	demanding	law	en-
forcement,	a	police	 force,	and	prison	sentences.42	Such	was	 the	suggestive	











Salomon	Maimon,	Essay on Transcendental 
Philosophy,	 translated	by	N.	Midgley	 et	 al.,	






phorical)	 expression	 is,	 even	 in	 Aristotle’s	
view,	 characteristic	 of	metaphors	 because	 it	
is	in	a	way,	the	connecting	link	between	these	
two	meanings.	“…	a	metaphor	makes	the	sig-
nified	 somehow	 [more]	 known	 through	 the	





γὰρ	 οἱ	 μεταφέροντες	 κατὰ	 τινὰ	 ὁμοιότητα	
μεταφέρουσιν·	Topica	140a10–12	(Aristotle,	
Posterior Analytics, Topica,	 translated	by	E.	
S.	 Forster	 (modified),	 Harvard	 University	
Press,	London	1960.
38
S.	 Maimon,	 Essay on Transcendental Phi-
losophy,	p.	163.	That	even	the	proper	names	
of	 regions	and	countries	may	be	given	from	
a	 similar	 principle,	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 names	
Anatolia for	Asia	Minor	 and	Nippon for	 Ja-
pan.	The	first,	“the land	from	where	the	sun	
rises”,	is	given	from	the	viewpoint	of	ancient	
Greeks	 (Gr.	 ἀνατολή	 from	 ἀνατέλλω	 “to	
come/rise	 from”).	The	 second,	 “Land	of	 the	
Rising	Sun”,	 is	given	from	the	viewpoint	of	















phors	 We	 Think	 With:	 The	 Role	 of	 Meta-




Part	 of	 the	 conclusion	 of	 Thibodeau	 and	
Boroditsky	 (ibid.)	 is	 worth	 citing	 here:	 “…	
despite	 the	 clear	 influence	 of	 the	metaphor,	
we	 found	 that	 participants	 generally	 identi-
fied	the	crime	statistics,	which	were	the	same	
for	both	groups,	and	not	the	metaphor,	as	the	
most	 influential	 aspect	 of	 the	 report.	 These	
findings	 suggest	 that	 metaphors	 can	 influ-
ence	 how	 people	 conceptualize	 and	 in	 turn	
approach	 solving	 an	 important	 social	 issue,	



































in	 (the	naturally	purpuseful)	 completion”	 (lit.	 “to	hold	oneself	 in	oneself’s	
perfection”).	Entelechy is	the	final	or	mature	state	a	natural	being	by	nature	
tends	to	attain,	and	brings	it	in	a	process	(also	called	ἐντελέχεια)	from	potency	












he	was	aware	of	 the	need	 to	create	 terminology	and	ways	 to	achieve	 it	by	




the	fact	that	these two classes of terms, the proper or regular and the	metaphorical	–	these	and	








“Further,	 in using metaphors to give names to nameless things [τὰ	ἀνώνυμα],	we must draw 
them	not	from	remote	but	from kindred and similar things [ἐκ	τῶν	συγγενῶν	καὶ	τῶν	ὁμοειδῶν],	
so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said.	(…)	Good	riddles	do,	in	
general,	provide	us	with	satisfactory	metaphors:	for	metaphors imply riddles, and therefore a 










into	Latin	 the	 several	 terms	of	 dialectics	 and	natural	 philosophy;	 for	 he	 it	was,	 as	 they	 say,	
who	first,	or	principally,	provided	Latin	names	for	‘phantasia,’	‘synkatathesis,’	‘epokhe,’	and	
‘katalepsis,’	as	well	as	for	‘atomon,’	‘ameres,’	‘kenon,’49	and	many	others	like	these,	contriving 
























tive/idiomatic	 terms”.	 Cf.	 the	 Latin	 transla-
tion	of	 the	16th	 century	 rhetorician	Antonio	
Riccobono:	 “...	 proprium	 autem	 et	 domesti-
cum	et	translatio	tantum	prosunt	ad	nudorum	
sermonum	 elocutionem.	 signum	 vero	 est,	




Aristoteles Latine interpretibus variis,	Georg	
Reimer,	Berlin	1830,	p.	720.
47
Aristotle,	 The Works of Aristotle. Vol. IX: 




καὶ	 τῶν	 ὁμοειδῶν	 μεταφέρειν	 ἐπὶ	 τὰ	
ἀνώνυμα	 ὠνομασμένως	 ὃ	 λεχθὲν	 δῆλόν	
ἐστιν	ὅτι	συγγενές	 (…)	καὶ	ὅλως	ἐκ	τῶν	εὖ	
ᾐνιγμένων	ἔστι	μεταφορὰς	λαβεῖν	ἐπιεικεῖς:	
μεταφοραὶ	 γὰρ	 αἰνίττονται,	ὥστε	 δῆλον	ὅτι	
εὖ	μετενήνεκται.	See:	Aristotle,	The Works of 
Aristotle.
49
“In	 Latin,	 respectively,	 visum	 (conception),	
assensio	 (assent),	 assensionis	 retentio	 (with-
holding	 of	 assent),	 comprehensio	 (percep-
tion),	 individuum	 (atom),	 vacuum	 (void);	
‘ameres’	 (indivisible),	with	 its	Latin	equiva-
lent,	 does	 not	 occur	 in	 the	 extant	 works	 of	
Cicero	(Gudeman).”
50
“ἐκεῖνος	 γάρ	 ἐστιν,	 ὥς	 φασιν,	 ὁ	 καὶ	 τὴν	
φαντασίαν	 καὶ	 τὴν	 συγκατάθεσιν	 καὶ	 τὴν	
ἐποχὴν	καὶ	τὴν	κατάληψιν,	ἔτι	δὲ	τὸ	ἄτομον,	τὸ	
ἀμερές,	τὸ	κενὸν,	ἄλλα	τε	πολλὰ	τῶν	τοιούτων	
ἐξονομάσας	 πρῶτος	 ἢ	 μάλιστα	 Ῥωμαίοις,	
τὰ μὲν μεταφοραῖς, τὰ δ᾽ οἰκειότησιν ἄλλαις 
γνώριμα καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησάμενος.”	
[emphasis	 Lj.	 F.	 Ježić].	 See:	 Plutarch,	 Plu-


































work	 excellently	 exemplifies	 how	 (Jewish	 religious)	 representations	 could	
be	thought	of	as	symbols	for	(Platonic	and	Stoic	philosophical)	concepts.	Let	
us	look	at	some	examples	in	his	Allegorical interpretation of Genesis II. and 
III.:52
“‘And	the	heaven	and	the	earth	and	all	their	world	were	completed.’	(Gen.	ii.	1).	(…)	For	us-
ing	symbolical	 language	he	[i.e.	Moses]	calls	 (συμβολικῶς	καλεῖ)	 the	mind	(ὁ	νοῦς)	heaven	
(οὐρανός),	since	heaven	is	the	abode	of	natures	discerned	only	by	mind,	but	sense-perception	
(ἡ	αἴσθησις)	he	calls	earth	(γῆ),	because	sense-perception	possesses	a	composition	of	a	more	































from	 its	 own	means	 of	 expression.	 It	may	 be	 influenced	 by	 language,	 but	















Translated	 from	 this	 original	 German	 text:	
“Indem	die	Bestimmtheiten	des	Gefühls,	der	
Anschauung,	 des	 Begehrens,	 des	 Willens	
usf.,	 insofern	 von	 ihnen	gewußt wird,	 über-
haupt	Vorstellungen	gennant	werden,	so	kann	
im	allgemeinen	gesagt	werden,	daß	die	Phi-
losophie	 Gedanken,	 Kategorien,	 aber	 näher	
Begriffe an	die	Stelle	der	Vorstellungen	setzt. 
Vorstellungen	 überhaupt	 können	 als	 Meta-
phern der	Gedanken	und	Begriffe	angesehen	
werden.	Damit	 aber,	 daß	man	Vorstellungen	
hat,	 kennt	 man	 noch	 nicht	 deren	 Bedeu-
tung	 für	das	Denken,	d.	h.	noch	nicht	deren	
Gedanken	 und	 Begriffe.	 Umgekehrt	 ist	 es	
auch	 zweierlei,	 Gedanken	 und	 Begriffe	 zu	
haben,	 und	 zu	 wissen,	 welches	 die	 ihnen	
entsprechenden	 Vorstellungen,	 Aunschau-
ungen,	 Gefühle	 sind.”	 See:	 Georg	Wilhelm	
Friedrich	 Hegel,	 Enzyklopädie der philoso-
phischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,	Fe-
lix	Meiner,	Hamburg	71969.
52
Philo,	Philo.	Volume I. With an English Trans-




























communicating	 ideas,	 emotions,	 and	desires	
by	means	of	a	system	of	voluntarily	produced	
symbols.”	See:	Edward	Sapir,	Language. An 





























Kako jezik i mišljenje utječu jedno na drugo?
Razmatranje njihova odnosa uz usporedno 
uključivanje povijesti filozofije i kognitivne lingvistike
Sažetak
U radu se istražuje odnos između jezika i mišljenja s obzirom na njihov mogući uzajamni utje-
caj. Dva se pitanja uzimaju za ključna: kako učimo značenja konvencionalnih jezičnih znakova, 
uključno s onima za apstraktne pojmove, i kako izražujemo naše izvorne uvide, misli i osjećaje 
još nekonvencionaliziranim jezičnim sredstvima. Na pitanja se sažeto odgovara, a potom se 
odgovori razrađuju pomoću suprotstavljenih gledišta te jezičnih primjera iz povijesti filozofije i 
kognitivne lingvistike. Zastupa se stav da jezični izrazi, uključno s metaforama, pretežno u sebe 
ugrađuju kako si ljudi predočavaju (ili su nekoć predočavali) svijet uobraziljom i kako ga takva 
drugima jezično predstavljaju (ili su ga predstavljali). Jezik zato ne pokazuje izravno niti kako 
svijet poimamo i razumijevamo niti kako ga konstruiramo u svojem mišljenju. S druge strane, 
simbolizacija posredstvom metafore i metonimije te tvorba novih riječi i izraza (verbalizacija) 













into	 how	 language	 functions	 by	 looking	 at	
how	it	comes	into	existence	and	evolves.
Ljudevit Fran Ježić
Wie beeinflussen Sprache und Denken einander?
Eine erneute Erwägung ihrer Beziehung mit parallelen 
Bezugnahmen auf die Geschichte der Philosophie und kognitive Linguistik
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel wird die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Denken in Hinsicht auf ihren wech-
selseitigen Einfluss untersucht. Zwei Fragen werden als besonders wichtig in Betracht genom-
men: Wie lernen wir die Bedeutungen von konventionellen sprachlichen Zeichen, einschließlich 
derjenigen für abstrakte Begriffe, und wie drücken wir unsere originellen Einsichten, Gedan-
ken und Gefühle durch noch-nicht-konventionelle Sprachmittel aus? Auf diese Fragen folgen 
komprimierte Antworten Antworten und danach längere Ausführungen auf der Basis von Bei-
spielen aus der Geschichte der Philosophie und kognitiven Linguistik. Es wird argumentiert, 
dass sprachliche Ausdrücke, einschließlich Metaphern, die Art und Weise verkörpern, wie die 
Menschen die Welt durch Einbildungskraft sich vorstellen (oder vormals vorstellten) und – zum 
Behuf der Mitteilung – den anderen durch Sprachsymbole wiedergeben (oder vormals wieder-
gaben). Die sprachlichen Ausdrücke zeigen daher unmittelbar weder wie wir die Welt begreifen 
und verstehen, noch wie wir sie in Gedanken konstruieren. Symbolisierung durch Metapher und 
Metonymie sowie kreative Verbalisierung unserer Erkenntnis, neue sowie abstrakte und philo-





Comment la langue et la pensée s’influencent mutuellement ?
Une reconsidération de leur relation avec références 
parallèles à l’histoire de la philosophie et la linguistique cognitive
Résumé
Ce travail interroge le rapport entre le langage et la pensée sous l’angle de leur possible in-
fluence mutuelle. Deux questions sont considérées comme centrales : comment fait-on l’ap-
prentissage de la signification des signes langagiers, incluant également ceux qui se rapportent 
aux concepts abstraits ; et comment exprime-t-on nos idées originelles, pensées et sentiments 
à travers des outils langagiers encore non-conventionnels. Nous répondrons aux questions de 
manière concise, puis nous développerons nos réponses à l’aide de points de vue opposés et 
d’exemples de l’histoire de la philosophie et de la linguistique cognitive qui portent sur le 
langage. Nous défendons la position selon laquelle les expressions du langage, métaphores 
comprises, forgent en leur sein de façon essentielle la manière dont les gens se représentent (ou 
se représentaient autrefois) le monde à travers l’imagination, et la manière dont ils le présentent 
(ou le présentaient autrefois), à travers le langage, aux autres. Pour cette raison, le langage ne 
montre de manière directe ni le monde tel que nous le concevons et comprenons, ni tel que nous 
le construisons dans notre pensée. Toutefois, la symbolisation par le biais de la métaphore et 
de la métonymie, mais aussi la verbalisation, permettent à notre connaissance de communiquer 
des significations nouvelles ou abstraites et philosophiquement exigeantes.
Mots-clés
langage,	 pensée,	 connaissance,	 métaphore	 conceptuelle,	 verbalisation,	 connaissance	 symbolique,	
Aristote,	Emmanuel	Kant,	philosophie	de	la	linguistique	cognitive,	George	Lakoff,	Marc	Johnson
